📚 Copart, Inc. (CPRT) — investigación Rational Compounder

Investigación hecha a mano: fundamentos, valor vs libros, prueba de utilidades retenidas, tendencias de ganancias, costo de capital y valor razonable — publicada tal como fue escrita, actualizada por última vez el 2026-09-19.

Investigación original en inglés — mostrada tal como fue escrita.

Notas de investigación del autor

Management Reputation	High
Debt Exposure	Low
Legal Exposure	Medium
Inflation Exposure	Medium
Business Understanding	High
Value Prospect	High
Progress Prospect	High
Wealth Prospect	High
Market Sentiment	Fear
Risk	Low
Insights	High
Stability within Industry	High
Ability to Change Pricing	Yes
Market Activity	Copart passes the stock-volume test with no concerns. The shares are highly liquid and heavily institutionally owned. However, from an owner-investor perspective, vehicle transaction volume is substantially more important than stock trading volume because it is the true driver of earnings and long-term value creation.
Public interest?	Yes
OK when inverted?	Medium
Great company at a fair price?	Medium
True earnings?	Yes
High fixed charges?	Yes
Would hold through a bear market?	Yes

The Business & Its Moat

Market Reality: Is this industry in a bubble that is about to burst? Is everyone taking and not adding?
The salvage auction industry does not appear to be in a bubble. Unlike speculative industries that depend on investor enthusiasm or easy capital, salvage auctions provide an essential service to insurance companies and vehicle owners. The concern is not that demand is disappearing, but that growth may be slowing as collision frequency declines and total-loss frequency approaches a mature level. If those trends continue, the industry is more likely transitioning from a high-growth phase into a mature-growth phase rather than facing an imminent collapse. The market's debate centers on future growth rates, not the viability of the business itself.
Is the company's product flat-lined for the market?
Copart's core product, processing and auctioning salvage vehicles, remains highly relevant and necessary, but its growth profile may be flattening. Vehicle demand on the platform remains strong, while the constraint appears to be vehicle supply entering the insurance claims system. The market is increasingly questioning whether the historical growth tailwinds from rising total-loss frequency can continue indefinitely. As a result, investors are less concerned about the usefulness of the product and more concerned about whether the volume of vehicles available to process can continue growing at historical rates.
Is the company open to or investigating other markets?
Yes. Management clearly recognizes the possibility that salvage growth alone may not sustain historical growth rates and has been actively pursuing new opportunities. The acquisition of ACV expands Copart into dealer-to-dealer wholesale vehicle remarketing, while management continues investing in international expansion, yard expansion, and technology initiatives. These actions suggest that Copart is proactively diversifying its vehicle supply sources and expanding beyond its traditional insurance-focused business model.
What is the financial community's appraisal of the industry and the company?
The financial community generally views vehicle remarketing and salvage auctions as a stable, difficult-to-replicate industry with meaningful network effects and high barriers to entry. Within that industry, Copart is widely regarded as the premier operator due to its scale, profitability, technology platform, buyer network, and strong balance sheet. Analyst sentiment remains broadly positive, with many firms maintaining Buy or Moderate Buy ratings despite recent growth concerns. The debate is not whether Copart has a strong business model, but whether future growth will remain attractive enough to justify premium valuation multiples.
Market Sentiment Assessment
Current market sentiment toward Copart appears to be moderately cautious, best described as mild fear rather than greed. Investors remain confident in the company's moat, management quality, balance sheet strength, and industry position, but there is growing uncertainty surrounding long-term vehicle supply growth and the possibility that earnings growth could settle into the mid-single digits. The market's concern is not business deterioration but growth deceleration. In sentiment terms, Copart appears to be in a "great company facing uncomfortable questions" phase rather than a "broken company" phase. Overall sentiment is slightly negative but far from pessimistic.

Challenges: Securing Long-Term Vehicle Supply
This is the single biggest challenge because every other success factor ultimately depends on having vehicles to sell. Copart's U.S. insurance unit volumes have recently declined, while management and industry observers point to pressures from insurance affordability, changing consumer coverage behavior, and evolving claims trends. The company can maintain market share, improve technology, and expand yards, but none of those can fully compensate if the source pool of vehicles grows slowly over time.
Successfully Integrating and Scaling ACV
The acquisition of ACV is arguably the most important strategic decision Copart has made in years. Management describes it as a new growth vector that expands the company into dealer-to-dealer wholesale remarketing and broadens its reach across the vehicle lifecycle. The challenge now is proving that ACV can become a meaningful earnings contributor rather than simply a complementary business.
Winning Against Entrenched Wholesale Competitors
Copart dominates salvage auctions, but the wholesale market is a different ecosystem. Dealer relationships, OEM relationships, fleet relationships, and leasing-company relationships have been cultivated for decades by established players such as Manheim. ACV helps bridge this gap, but converting those relationships into sustainable market share gains will be difficult and likely take years.
Maintaining Profitability While Volumes Slow
Recent results show a divergence between pricing and volume. Revenue per vehicle and average selling prices have held up relatively well, but unit volumes have declined and operating costs have continued rising. FY2026 revenue increased only 0.4%, while operating income fell 2.6% and net income declined 4.4%. Maintaining Copart's historically exceptional margins as growth slows is becoming increasingly important.
Finding New Growth Drivers Large Enough to Matter
This challenge is different from vehicle supply. Copart has already become a very large and highly profitable business. Historically, yard expansion, technology investment, international growth, and insurer market-share gains produced outstanding returns. The question now is whether future opportunities are large enough to sustain the historical level of earnings growth. Management appears to be addressing this through wholesale expansion, ACV, technology, and international markets, but the scale required today is much larger than it was ten years ago.
Copart's primary challenge is not profitability or business sustainability, but maintaining the growth rates that historically justified its premium valuation. While the company's moat remains intact and financial strength is unquestioned, slowing vehicle supply growth has raised concerns about its future earnings trajectory. The acquisition of ACV Auctions could provide a meaningful new growth engine by expanding Copart into the larger wholesale vehicle market, but the success of this strategy will depend on successful integration and execution, which cannot be assessed until the merger is fully implemented.

Trademark Product / Differentiator: Trademark Product / Statistical Advantage
Copart's true product is not the vehicle itself. Its differentiator is an integrated marketplace consisting of a massive yard network, a global buyer network, insurer relationships, logistics capabilities, and an online auction platform. The statistical advantage comes from consistently generating higher recovery values for sellers by exposing vehicles to a larger pool of buyers. This advantage is both technological and psychological. The technology creates efficient auctions and broad buyer reach, while network effects, familiarity, trust, and social proof reinforce participation from both buyers and insurers.
What Do I Know About the Product?
The primary sources are company disclosures, earnings releases, investor presentations, industry structure, and my own analysis of the business model. Copart's customers are primarily insurance companies, while buyers include dismantlers, rebuilders, exporters, dealers, and other professional vehicle purchasers. The evidence suggests that Copart's value proposition is maximizing recovery values and simplifying the entire remarketing process for sellers.
Technology, Research, and Product Development
Copart continuously invests in technology, automation, data systems, digital auctions, logistics, and marketplace functionality. The recent acquisition of ACV Auctions is evidence that management is actively expanding beyond salvage vehicles into wholesale remarketing. Rather than inventing unrelated products, Copart tends to build adjacent services around its core competency: vehicle remarketing. Historically, this strategy has been successful, as the company evolved from physical salvage yards into one of the largest digital vehicle marketplaces in the world.
Production, Sales, and Research
The company's "production" process is effectively vehicle acquisition, storage, processing, transportation, title management, and auction execution. Sales are driven by marketplace liquidity and buyer participation rather than traditional sales efforts. Research and development are primarily focused on operational efficiency, technology, data, and expanding the addressable market through initiatives such as wholesale auctions and international expansion.
Was the Company First?
No. Copart did not invent salvage auctions. However, it was an early pioneer in moving salvage auctions online and was instrumental in digitizing the industry. This gave it a significant head start in building scale, data, and marketplace liquidity.
Is the Company a Leader?
Yes. Copart is widely regarded as the market leader in online salvage vehicle auctions with operations across multiple countries and more than 250 locations. Scale itself has become a competitive advantage because larger networks attract more vehicles and more buyers, reinforcing marketplace liquidity.
Does the Product Have a Special Advantage Like Coca-Cola or See's Candies?
Not in the traditional consumer-brand sense. Nobody chooses Copart because of emotional attachment like a Coca-Cola customer. Instead, Copart's advantage comes from network effects, trust, convenience, scale, and superior economics. The closest analogy is not Coca-Cola but a dominant marketplace like Visa, eBay, or a stock exchange. Participants join because everyone else is already there.
Can It Keep Its Good Results in the Future?
Most likely yes, although growth rates are the key uncertainty. The moat appears durable because it is supported by multiple reinforcing advantages: insurer relationships, buyer networks, physical infrastructure, technology, data, reputation, and economies of scale. The bigger question is not whether Copart can remain successful, but whether it can maintain growth strong enough to justify premium valuations. The future likely depends on vehicle supply growth, international expansion, and the success of integrating ACV Auctions.

Advantage of Scale: Copart's greatest scale advantage is not its yards or technology individually, but the combination of both. Its global buyer network, physical infrastructure, insurer relationships, operational efficiency, and marketplace liquidity create a flywheel that becomes stronger as it grows. The result is a system that consistently delivers recovery values and marketplace liquidity that would be extremely difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for a new entrant to replicate.

Specialised Within Its Ecosystem: Copart is a highly specialized and highly respected leader in vehicle remarketing. The company appears to be experiencing a growth challenge rather than a business-quality challenge. Its core moat remains intact, and management is proactively pursuing new growth avenues through wholesale vehicle remarketing and the acquisition of ACV Auctions.

Circle of Competence: Copart remains firmly within its circle of competence. The acquisition of ACV Auctions is not a departure from its expertise but an expansion into a closely related market. The primary risk is integration and execution, not capital misallocation into an unfamiliar business.

Big Wave to Ride: The original wave that made Copart great was the digitization of salvage auctions and the growth of its marketplace. That wave is maturing. The investment thesis today depends on whether the company can create a second wave through the ACV acquisition and broader vehicle remarketing ecosystem. If it succeeds, the growth story continues. If it fails, Copart likely remains a great business but becomes a slower-growing one.

Source of Income: Copart's source of income is straightforward, durable, and easy to understand. It earns money by facilitating vehicle transactions and providing related services rather than relying on exotic financial structures or cyclical speculation. This is exactly the type of income source long-term investors typically prefer because it is transparent, scalable, and closely linked to the company's competitive advantages.

Small & Promising, or Large & Ordinary: Large & Exceptional

Risk & Inversion

Inversion Angle: There are 5 questions to address Copart's inversion. The first one is below:
*What if salvage vehicle supply never meaningfully grows again because total-loss frequency permanently flattens or declines as ADAS, autonomous safety technology, and improving vehicle durability reduce accident severity faster than repair costs increase? We have deduced that the formula for Copart Vehicle Supply is Copart Vehicle Supply = Insured Vehicle Supply * Collision Frequency * Total Loss Frequency * Copart Market Share. Collision frequency may have structurally declined because COVID permanently changed driving patterns through remote and hybrid work, people are commuting less, and modern vehicles continue to get safer through ADAS and other safety technologies. At the same time, total-loss frequency growth is slowing because repair-cost inflation, vehicle complexity, and higher parts costs have already pushed a much larger share of claims into the total-loss category, making further increases progressively harder to achieve. TLF's surge was large enough to mask CF's permanent shortfall for years, growing supply overall despite CF never recovering. Now that TLF is running out of room, it can no longer paper over CF's gap — so CF's stagnant, permanently-lower base is about to become the real constraint. Less fuel (CF, structurally capped and still eroding via ADAS) feeding a fading multiplier (TLF, hitting its ceiling) — that's why vehicle intake growth is slowing, and why it's more likely to keep slowing rather than reaccelerate. The calculated growth only for salvage vehicles is 5.4% and the growth from ACV acquisition will be 6.4% - 9.0% combined growth after ACV acquisition. This is a reduction from double digits growth to single digit growth. Copart is living worst case scenario with a strong likelihood of supply vehicle decline and a meaningful reduction of growth. This can really hurt them and they are trying to bring growth back by diversification.
*What if Copart's push into whole-car and dealer auctions completely stalls against Manheim's entrenched dealer, OEM, leasing, rental fleet, and finance company relationships, resulting in little or no meaningful wholesale market share gains? If Copart fails to gain meaningful share in wholesale vehicles, then ACV becomes a nice adjacent business rather than a new growth engine. In that case, the company's long-term growth rate probably remains closer to the growth rate of the underlying salvage market which is 5.4% and 6.4% combined.
*What if the recent slowdown is structural rather than temporary, causing long-term earnings growth to permanently settle in the mid-single digits instead of returning to double-digit growth rates? The slowdown appears to be structural, salvage vehicle supply appears to have peaked. This has taken Copart to make a strategic acquisition with ACV to access a bigger supply of vehicles.
*What if Copart's moat is weaker than it appears, causing its technology advantage, profit-per-vehicle advantage, recovery-value advantage, and pricing power to steadily compress toward industry norms? Copart's moat appears to be very strong with a strong profit per vehicle above its peers and with a strong buyer network; however, it has a weak point which is the supply of vehicles. Moat is intact even at the current conditions.
*What if Jay Adair's strategy of wholesale expansion, international expansion, yard expansion, acquisitions, and technology investment generates diminishing returns, causing ROIC, margins, and shareholder returns to trend materially lower over time? Growth will revert to 6.4% or 5.4% with no signs of getting back to double digits.

Breakeven Price: Breakeven revenue is 1.30 billion with a 72% buffer.

No Brainer Question: Will Copart be able to recover double-digit growth in the coming years, or will it remain a single-digit grower?
Copart is likely to experience single-digit growth in the short term as the salvage market works through current supply constraints and investors reassess growth expectations. However, the company has a reasonable chance of returning to low double-digit earnings growth in the medium term if the integration of ACV Auctions is successful and management is able to leverage its infrastructure, buyer network, and technology platform across a broader vehicle remarketing ecosystem. Until those benefits are fully realized, valuation concerns are likely to continue weighing on investor sentiment.

1 Foot Fence, Big Reward the Other Side: Copart would become a one-foot fence if the valuation provided a larger margin of safety. At the current valuation, investors must correctly forecast future growth, which makes the fence meaningfully taller.

Probability & Decision Trees: Bull Case (20%)

→ ACV Auctions successfully integrates and becomes a meaningful second growth engine (70% probability), salvage vehicle supply stabilizes and grows in line with vehicle population and insurance exposure (70% probability), and Copart gains a modest share of the wholesale market (40% probability). Combined outcome probability ≈ 20%.
→ Copart returns to 12%-15% earnings growth, investor confidence returns, and premium valuation multiples remain justified.

Base Case (60%)

→ ACV Auctions integrates successfully but contributes gradually rather than transforming the company overnight (90% probability), salvage growth remains modest but positive (80% probability), and wholesale expansion provides incremental growth without major market-share disruption (80% probability). Combined outcome probability ≈ 60%.
→ Copart delivers 8%-11% earnings growth, remains an excellent business, and shareholders receive satisfactory long-term returns without significant valuation expansion.

Bear Case (20%)

→ Salvage vehicle supply growth proves structurally constrained (50% probability), ACV Auctions fails to materially accelerate growth (40% probability), and wholesale competition from Manheim limits market-share gains (50% probability). Combined outcome probability ≈ 20%.
→ Copart settles into 5%-7% earnings growth, remains highly profitable and financially sound, but valuation gradually compresses as investors accept that the company has become a mature growth business.

Copart's buyer network has a strong chance of reaching ACV's network; it only needs 5% of Copart's buyer network to double ACV revenue. This increases the chances of a successful acquisition to high.

Psychology & Munger Tendencies

Sauerkraut Effect: Copart displays a strong Sauerkraut Effect across its entire marketplace. Buyers use Copart because other buyers use Copart, and suppliers use Copart because other suppliers use Copart. Over decades, familiarity, social proof, and authority have reinforced one another, making Copart the default destination for salvage vehicle remarketing. Large insurers trust Copart because the industry's largest insurers already use it, while rebuilders, dismantlers, and exporters gravitate toward Copart because the deepest pool of professional buyers is already there. This psychological reinforcement strengthens the company's network effects, creating a self-reinforcing cycle where scale attracts participation and participation attracts more scale. As a result, many industry participants are no longer actively choosing Copart over alternatives; Copart has become the industry standard, which is a powerful and often underappreciated component of its moat. The exception is wholesale auctions, where Manheim currently enjoys a similar advantage and where Copart is attempting to build the same effect through the acquisition of ACV Auctions.

Lollapalooza Effect: Copart is one of the better examples of a Lollapalooza Effect because several powerful forces reinforce one another simultaneously. The company benefits from network effects (more buyers attract more sellers, and vice versa), the Sauerkraut Effect (buyers and insurers use Copart because everyone else uses Copart), switching costs (insurers are reluctant to risk lower recovery values by changing providers), trust and reputation effects built over decades, economies of scale through its extensive yard network and technology platform, and authority/social proof as major insurers and professional buyers continue to transact on the platform. These forces do not operate independently; they strengthen one another. More buyers improve recovery values, higher recovery values attract more insurers, more insurers attract more inventory, and more inventory attracts more buyers. Over time, this creates a self-reinforcing cycle that becomes increasingly difficult for competitors to disrupt. The result is that Copart's moat is not built on a single advantage but on multiple psychological, operational, and economic advantages working together, which is precisely what Charlie Munger described as a Lollapalooza Effect. The only area where this effect is less mature is wholesale vehicle auctions, where Copart is attempting to replicate the same dynamics through the acquisition of ACV Auctions.

Ideology Affected: Copart is largely unaffected by ideology because its value proposition is based on economics rather than beliefs, preferences, or social movements. Insurance companies use Copart because it maximizes recovery values, buyers use Copart because it provides the deepest inventory and liquidity, and sellers use Copart because it delivers efficient remarketing. The business does not depend on political affiliation, consumer identity, environmental narratives, cultural trends, or changing social attitudes. A totaled vehicle still needs to be sold regardless of who is in government or which ideas are currently popular.

The only modest ideological exposure comes indirectly through regulations affecting vehicle repair standards, insurance requirements, environmental laws, or international trade policies. However, these factors influence the industry's operating environment rather than the fundamental demand for Copart's services.

Multidisciplinary Approach: 1. Economics & Network Effects
This is probably the most important discipline. Copart operates a two-sided marketplace where more buyers attract more sellers and more sellers attract more buyers. This network effect increases liquidity, improves recovery values, and makes the platform increasingly valuable as it scales. The larger the network becomes, the harder it is for competitors to replicate.
2. Psychology & Behavioral Science
Copart benefits from trust, familiarity, social proof, and authority effects. Insurance companies prefer providers with proven track records, and buyers gravitate toward the marketplace where most professional participants already operate. These behavioral tendencies reinforce marketplace dominance and strengthen the network effect.
3. Technology
Copart's online auction platform, digital workflows, title processing systems, logistics management, and automation capabilities are major competitive advantages. Technology allows the company to process millions of vehicles while maintaining operating efficiencies that competitors struggle to match. The acquisition of ACV Auctions further expands its technology capabilities.
4. Logistics & Operations
Many investors underestimate this discipline. Copart's yard network, transportation infrastructure, storage capacity, and operational processes create significant barriers to entry. The business requires physical assets alongside digital capabilities. This combination makes replication expensive and time-consuming.
5. Insurance Economics
Copart's entire business depends on understanding the insurance claims process, vehicle repair costs, total-loss frequency, and salvage recovery values. Its value proposition to insurers is maximizing recovery proceeds while reducing administrative complexity.
6. Data & Analytics
Every auction generates pricing data, buyer behavior data, demand signals, and recovery-value benchmarks. Over decades, Copart has accumulated a valuable dataset that helps improve pricing, auction efficiency, and decision-making.
7. Capital Allocation
The company's growth has been driven not only by operations but also by intelligent capital allocation. Yard expansion, international growth, technology investment, share repurchases, and the acquisition of ACV Auctions all demonstrate the importance of management's capital allocation decisions.

Copart's success is not driven by one discipline but by the interaction of economics, psychology, technology, logistics, insurance expertise, data analytics, and capital allocation. The combination of these disciplines creates a moat that is far more powerful than any single advantage alone.

First Principles: Copart appears to be a low-risk business with a high-quality moat. The investment debate is not about whether the company survives or remains profitable. It is about whether the ACV acquisition becomes a meaningful second growth engine capable of restoring sustainable low double-digit growth. Everything else is largely secondary.

Tendencies - Market/Product 1: 24) Lollapalooza tendency

Tendencies - Market/Product 2: 1) Reward and Punishment Superresponse

Tendencies - Company 1: 24) Lollapalooza tendency

Tendencies - Company 2: 1) Reward and Punishment Superresponse

The Investment Case

Why Is This a Good Investment?: Copart has a strong moat, no demand problem, and operates in an effective duopoly. Its yard network, buyer network, insurer relationships, technology platform, and decades of operational know-how make the business extremely difficult to replicate. The core business remains intact, highly profitable, and resilient. The primary risk is not competition, disruption, or business deterioration. The primary risk is growth. Vehicle supply appears to be the limiting factor, and management's acquisition of ACV Auctions is an attempt to solve that constraint by expanding into wholesale vehicle remarketing. If successful, Copart can likely return to higher growth rates; if unsuccessful, it will probably remain an excellent business, but a slower-growing one.

Buffett Tenets: Copart passes nearly every Buffett test. The business is simple, understandable, highly profitable, protected by a strong moat, operated by rational management, and supported by favorable long-term economics. The only material concern is whether management can solve the vehicle supply constraint and restore higher growth rates. Therefore, this is best described as a high-quality business trading around fair value rather than a deep-value opportunity.

Stock vs Bond Comparison: Copart passes the Stock vs Bond test. At fair value, I estimate expected returns of roughly 7%–9%, providing a 2%–4% premium over government bonds. At my preferred entry price of $27–$28, expected returns rise to approximately 9%–11%+, creating a more attractive equity risk premium. The company offers higher expected returns than bonds while maintaining relatively low business risk, although the reward profile is still moderate compared to smaller, higher-growth investment opportunities.

Which Famous Investors Hold This?: Chuck Akre
David Rolfe
Donald Yacktman
Francois Rochon
Nicolai Tangen
Eric H. Schoenstein
Frederick "Shad" Rowe

Chart Analysis: Yes

Speculation / Investment Type: Analyst's Investment/Growth Investment

Popular?: Popular

Any share buybacks?: Copart has been aggressively repurchasing shares. In FY2026 alone, the company spent approximately $1.63 billion on share repurchases, which is substantial relative to its earnings power. This suggests management believes capital can be allocated attractively through buybacks and that they have confidence in the long-term value of the business.

Shareholders have generally experienced net share count reduction rather than dilution.

Forecasted earnings possible/plausible/probable?: A 7.7% growth forecast passes all three tests. It is possible because the industry's economics support it, plausible because the calculations are grounded in observable business drivers, and probable because the assumptions required are relatively modest. In fact, I would argue that 7.7% is closer to a "most likely" outcome than either the bull case or bear case. It assumes Copart remains an exceptional business while acknowledging that vehicle supply growth has structurally slowed and that ACV's contribution is likely incremental rather than immediately transformative

Financial Diligence

Have You Checked the Taxes?: Copart also passes the tax sanity check. The company paid an effective tax rate of roughly 19% last year, which is broadly consistent with expectations for a profitable corporation. Earnings appear to be driven by the underlying economics of the business rather than by aggressive tax strategies, one-time tax benefits, or accounting distortions. This increases confidence that reported profits and cash generation are representative of the true earning power of the business.

Earning Forecast: Earnings forecast for the next 5 years is 7.7%.

If a Private Business, How Would I Measure It?: If Copart were a private business, I would focus primarily on profit per vehicle sold. This metric captures whether the company's moat, pricing power, operational efficiency, buyer liquidity, technology, and insurer relationships are strengthening over time. A business that consistently increases profit per unit while maintaining market share is usually creating real economic value. Copart has historically demonstrated strong and improving economics on a per-vehicle basis, suggesting that management continues to allocate capital effectively and that the underlying moat remains intact. By this measure, Copart passes the test with no major concerns.

Management & Context

CEO Time With Company: 37 years

How Old Is the Business?: 44 years

Competitors Analysis 2: Copart's main competitor in the salvage segment is IAA, while Manheim is the main competitor in the wholesale vehicle market. Copart operates in a duopoly in the salvage vehicle segment and is the dominant player in that market, whereas it is a much smaller participant in the wholesale vehicle segment, where Manheim is the market leader.

Salvage Vehicle Market Competitor Analysis

Copart is the dominant player in this segment and generated roughly double the profit of IAA based on the last set of financial information published before IAA was acquired by RB Global. Even when comparing Copart against RB Global as a whole using 2025 results, Copart nearly quadruples IAA's profitability despite operating primarily in a single segment. Copart is significantly more profitable because it has built a highly automated vehicle remarketing platform supported by a massive yard network and a global buyer base, allowing it to generate substantially more profit from each vehicle that passes through its system.

Copart appears to have developed a software-driven operating system around its yard network that maximizes recovery values while minimizing labour per vehicle. In contrast, RB Global operates a broader collection of businesses with less concentrated marketplace economics. There are still opportunities for further automation, particularly in towing, transportation, and other manual processes. The company remains focused on improving information workflow automation and appears to be well ahead of competitors, with plenty of runway for further operational improvements. The main constraint at present is vehicle supply. Copart may own approximately 11,240 acres of land, which could be worth around $2.8 billion, representing close to 20% of shareholder equity.

Wholesale Vehicle Market Competitor Analysis

The main competitor in the wholesale vehicle market is Manheim, which controls a substantial portion of the market, while Copart remains a relatively small player. Manheim appears to hold approximately 42% market share, ADESA around 27%, and all other participants account for the remaining 31%.

The U.S. wholesale vehicle market processes approximately 16.7 million vehicles annually, whereas Copart handles only around 600,000 vehicles in wholesale operations, suggesting a significant growth opportunity. The company already has the technology, yard infrastructure, and buyer network; what it needs is greater access to sellers. Taking meaningful market share from the established players may not be as difficult as it appears if the strategy is executed correctly. There is a lot to gain and relatively little to lose.

Employees: Copart passes the employee test, but not with distinction. Employee reviews suggest recurring management and culture issues, particularly at the operational level. Fortunately for investors, the moat appears to be driven far more by the business model, network effects, yard infrastructure, and insurer relationships than by employee satisfaction.

Fundamentos

Earning Yield	5.2%
Price to Sales ratio	5.81x
Total Current Assets	$5,568,194,000
Inventory	$51,382,000
Working Capital	$4,864,453,000
Tangible Asset Value	$8,552,106,000
Market Cap/Tangible Asset Value	3.17x
Income Tax Expense	$354,580,000
% Income Paid on Taxes	19.3%
Book Value Per Share	$9.60
1.5xBV	$14.40
Interest Coverage	0.00x
Working Capital to Debt	66.45x
EV To Free Cash Flow	19.96x
Net Income Ratio	31.8%
Free Cash Flow Yield	4.7%
Intangibles To Total Assets	5.6%
Price to Equity Ratio	2.97x
Return on Tangible Assets	15.7%
ROE	15.9%
Operating Income Ratio	35.4%
PFCF Ratio	21.39x
ROIC	14.3%
Debt to Assets	0.9%
Quick Ratio	7.84x
Current Ratio	7.91x
Debt to Equity	0.01x
Covariance (SP500)	19,325.64
Correlation (SP500)	0.80x

Valor vs Libros

Share Price	$29.28
52 Week High	$47.00
52 Week Low	$26.81
Free Cash Flow (TTM)	$1,267,129,000
IV/BV	3.38x

Utilidades Retenidas

Share Price	$29.28
52 Week High	$47.00
52 Week Low	$26.81
Market Cap (TTM)	$27,107,760,193
EPS (TTM)	$1.56
Dividend (TTM)	$0.00
Ratio P/(E-D)	21.18x
Dividend Yield (TTM)	0.0%
Retained Earnings (TTM)	$1.56
10Y Retained Earnings (From Last FY)	$9.04

Tendencias de Ganancias

10y Average Earnings	$0.90
4y Average Earnings	$1.37
Max Earnings	$1.61
Min Earnings	$0.30
10y EPS Variance	18.8%
10y EPS SD	$0.43
4y EPS SD	$0.17
10y AVG+SD	1.34x
4y AVG+SD	1.54x
Average 10 Year Growth	18.8%
10Y Growth (3Y AVG)	289.0%
PE Ratio Average	29.47x
PE Ratio Average 3 Years	19.14x
ETP% Vs AA Bond	5.2%
AVG PE 3Y*PTB Ratio	58.49

Costo de Capital

Market Cap (TTM)	$27,107,760,193
Enterprise Value (TTM)	$25,288,226,193
Long Term Debt (TTM)	$73,204,000
Interest Expense (TTM)	$0.00
ROIC (TTM)	14.3%
Income Before Tax (TTM)	$1,834,977,000
WACC	9.8%
Total Investments (TTM)	$2,581,901,000

Valor Razonable

Factor of Safety Buffet	1.06x
Forecast EPS 1y	$1.73
Forecast EPS 5y	$2.36
EPS 5y Growth	46.9%
Average P/E	29.47x
Discount Rate	9.0%
Owner Earnings Growth Rate	8.0%
Share Price 10Y	$30.52

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